Untimely Punishment and Dubious Desert by WILLIAMS, John N.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
7-2002
Untimely Punishment and Dubious Desert
John N. WILLIAMS
Singapore Management University, johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N., "Untimely Punishment and Dubious Desert" (2002). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 10.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/10
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/10
 SMU HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Untimely Punishment and Dubious Desert 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John N. Williams 
 
July 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper No. 4-2002 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL SCIENCES, SMU 
 
 
 
 
John Williams 
School of Economics and Social Sciences 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
UNTIMELY PUNISHMENT AND DUBIOUS DESERT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Discussions of punishment have always assumed (e.g.[4, pp. 80-5]) that there are no 
circumstances in which someone can be justifiably punished for a crime that he will commit.  
This assumption has been directly challenged by Christopher New’s apparent example of 
morally justified ‘prepunishment’[7].  In a recent paper, Fred Feldman rejects the ‘received 
wisdom’1 that desert cannot precede its basis by giving apparent examples of ‘predeserved’ 
charity, reward and apology [3, pp. 71-75].  If there can be cases of predeserved punishment 
as well, then anyone who holds that it is morally justifiable to punish an offender if and only 
if he deserves it, must agree with New.  For such desert theorists must say that since the 
offender predeserves punishment then it is morally right to prepunish him. Feldman himself 
however gives reasons why no legal authority should ever decide that someone predeserves 
punishment [3, pp. 76-78].    But a careful examination of New’s example shows that these 
reasons are inadequate.  In any case, Feldman is committed to the different but undefended 
claim that there can be no cases of predeserved punishment.  In fact the desert theorist has an 
excellent reason for defending this claim. Good reasons for saying that prepunishment is 
wrong are also available to the deterrence theorist.  Given the correctness of our intuition that 
this is the right verdict, both theorists pass the test of  New’s fantastic example.  But the 
desert theorist passes it better, because the all the reasons available to the deterrence theorist 
for judging prepunishment wrong are subordinate to those of the desert theorist.  Finally I 
argue that despite Feldman’s examples,  there is no reason to think that there are any 
predeserts at all.  
 
II. New’s Example 
  
New’s example is essentially as follows.  Ben, a traffic policeman, is certain beyond 
reasonable doubt that Algy, an eccentric speedster, intends to speed tomorrow.  Ben is 
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powerless to prevent Algy from speeding, since he is unable to reach the scene of the offence 
in time.  He is likewise powerless to ‘postpunish’ Algy, for he knows that if he issues a 
summons after the offence, Algy will skip the county and avoid paying the fine.   
 New claims that Ben is morally justified in prepunishing Algy by fining him now, 
provided that Ben is certain beyond reasonable doubt that Algy will fulfill his intention to 
speed [1992, p. 36].   
 The satisfaction of this proviso is one of three features needed for the example to 
count as a case of morally justified prepunishment.  Since certainty beyond reasonable doubt 
(as opposed to knowledge) is all Ben needs for justifiable postpunishment, it is likewise all 
he needs for justifiable prepunishment.  Moreover, there seem to be ways of satisfying this 
proviso, for instance by providing inductive support.  Thus we might embellish the example 
by stipulating that Algy  has a long history of speeding each day, each time signing a written 
confession which he then sends to Ben.  This time Algy shows Ben the confession he has 
already prepared and informs him that he intends to speed tomorrow and then sign the 
confession.   
 The second feature needed by the example is Ben’s reasonable certainty that he is 
unable to prevent Algy from speeding.  This follows from Ben’s reasonable certainty that 
Algy will speed.  We could take this as the reasonable certainty that Algy will speed, 
whatever Ben does, or we could take it, following Feldman [3, p. 77], as the reasonable 
certainty that Agly will speed unless Ben prevents him from so doing.  If Ben is reasonably 
certain in the first way then he should also be reasonably certain that he is powerless to 
prevent Algy from speeding.  If he is reasonably certain in the second way, then unless he 
was also reasonably certain that he was powerless to prevent Algy from speeding, it would be 
Ben’s duty to try to prevent him from speeding, rather than prepunishing him.  
 Finally we need to say that Ben is unable to postpunish Algy.  This confronts him 
with a choice; since postpunishment would be justified, shouldn’t he prepunish Algy in 
preference to not punishing him at all?   
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 III. The Role Of The Example As Fantastic 
 
One might insist that by definition, prepunishment is logically impossible.  If so then the 
question of the morally justifiability of prepunishment cannot arise.  Since there can be no 
cases of prepunishment, there can be no cases of prepunishment which are morally justified.  
 One argument that prepunishment is logically impossible is that it is an essential part 
of the meaning of the word ‘punish’ that punishment is for a past offence.   John Cottingham 
appears to be committed to this conclusion, since he claims that the logic of the verb ‘punish’ 
is inherently retrospective: we cannot understand such a verb without grasping that its use 
involves an intrinsic reference back to some past event [1, p. 662].   
 This argument should remind us of a particular utilitarian response to examples given 
by the desert theorist in which following the principle of utility commits us to punishing the 
innocent.  The utilitarian might respond by insisting that such cases cannot arise, since by 
definition, punishment is not punishment of the innocent (cf. [9, pp. 58-9]). So since there 
can be no cases of punishing the innocent, there can be no cases of punishing the innocent 
which the principle of utility must bring about.  It is now widely accepted that this 
definitional manoeuvre misses the real issue [14, pp.14-17] .  The mere insistence on the 
definition begs the question against a desert theorist who holds that there is no reason why 
the term ‘punish’ cannot be extended to apply to the innocent.  Moreover, even if the desert 
theorist concedes that the term ‘punish’ intrinsically excludes such cases, he can stipulate a 
new term ‘punish*’ which is like the old term in all respects save that it includes such cases 
as well.  Then he can consistently object that there are cases in which the principle of utility 
must tell us to punish* someone who is innocent.  He can even frame his objection in a way 
that does not represent the infliction of suffering on the innocent as a form of punishment at 
all.  Instead of objecting that punishing the innocent sometimes maximises utility, he can 
merely object that making them suffer sometimes maximises it. Making Cottingham’s claim 
to rule New’s example out of court unfairly invokes the same definitional manoeuvre.  Even 
if our use of the verb ‘punish’ is normally backward-looking, that may simply be because we 
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have not yet considered forward-looking cases like New’s.  So the mere insistence that 
punishment is essentially backward-looking just begs the question of whether New’s example 
is a possible scenario. In any case, New can cheerfully concede that the word ‘punish’ is 
essentially backward-looking, because  he is free to stipulate a new term ‘punish*’ which is 
not .  Then he can claim consistently that Ben has justification to prepunish* Algy.  Or 
instead of claiming that Ben is morally justified in punishing Algy for speeding tomorrow, he 
can merely claim that Ben has moral justification (in terms of desert or deterrence) for 
inflicting suffering on Algy for speeding tomorrow.  Whether suffering is inflicted on those 
who are  innocent or on those who are future offenders, the real issue is not whether we 
should call the infliction ‘punishment’ but rather whether it is morally justifiable. 
 There is also a second argument that prepunishment is logically impossible.  This is 
that because future offences cannot take place now, there is literally nothing for which we 
can prepunish, so since punishment is always punishment for something, prepunishment is 
never punishment at all.  The invalidity of this argument is demonstrated by a parallel 
argument against the possibility of prepayment. It is an obvious mistake to argue that since 
services rendered in the future cannot be rendered now, there is literally nothing for which 
we can pay, so since payment is always payment for something, prepayment is never 
payment at all.  Although, in a certain sense, there is now nothing for which we are paying, it 
doesn’t follow that we are now paying for nothing. 
 Hostility to New’s example might be the result of generalising from cases of 
prepunishment which are logically absurd in some way or other.  For instance, if Ben were 
reasonably certain that Algy will commit a murder tomorrow then Ben could hardly be 
justified in executing Algy today.  Nor could he be justified in imprisoning him today for a 
ten-year sentence.  Execution and imprisonment are forms of punishment which prevent the 
would-be crime from being committed.  In so punishing Algy, Ben should be reasonably 
certain that Algy will not commit murder tomorrow, which thus deprives him of the 
epistemic, and thus moral, justification needed for such punishment.  A different set of 
factive paradoxes is spawned if we suppose that Ben’s reasonable certainty that Algy will 
speed has been strengthened to knowledge.  For then prepunishment would be impossible.  
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Ben cannot execute Algy or imprison him for a ten-year sentence in the knowledge that he 
will commit murder tomorrow.  But the logical oddity of such cases does not extend to New’s 
example.  In any case the oddity is harmless.  What we should really say is that in knowing or 
being reasonably certain that Algy will commit murder tomorrow, Ben should know or be 
reasonably certain that he will not be executed or imprisoned today, because Ben knows or is 
reasonably certain that he is powerless to prevent the murder. 
 We are thus entitled to say that there is nothing logically impossible or logically 
absurd about the example.  And we could mitigate its appearance of triviality by stipulating a 
more serious offence, corresponding to a graver punishment.  But we should concede that it 
typifies a situation that would rarely arise. Yet the example has a useful role to play, 
precisely because it is fantastic. It can be seen as a thought-experiment which tests theories of 
what justifies punishment against our initial intuition that prepunishment is wrong, by 
extending such theories into the example.      
 
IV. A Bad Reason For The Kantian: The Objection From Autonomy 
 
A broadly Kantian objection to the moral justifiability of prepunishment is that it constitutes 
a lack of respect for the offender’s autonomy or capacity to make morally significant choices.  
Thus Smilansky objects to prepunishment on the grounds that it fails to acknowledge the 
possibility that the person punished will make a choice that constitutes ‘last-minute moral 
improvement’ [12, p. 52].  But Ben’s reasonable certainty that Algy will speed tomorrow 
does not entail that Algy will have no choice tomorrow whether to speed.  All that it does 
entail is that Ben should be reasonably certain of the way that Algy will use that choice, 
namely to speed.  Even if Ben’s reasonable certainty were strengthened to knowledge, this 
would still not rule out Algy’s ability to choose not to speed tomorrow.  For although it is 
logically necessary that if Ben knows that Algy will speed tomorrow then Algy will speed 
tomorrow, this necessity lies only in the connection between what is known of tomorrow and 
what is true of tomorrow.  It would be  fallacious to conclude that since Ben knows that Algy 
will speed tomorrow then it is logically necessary that Algy will speed tomorrow.  Similarly, 
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although it is logically necessary that if Smith is a bachelor then he is unmarried, we would 
be guilty of precisely the same fallacy in concluding that since Smith is a bachelor, it is 
logically necessary that he is unmarried. Moreover, if Ben’s knowledge that Algy will speed 
tomorrow did entail that Algy will not tomorrow freely choose whether to speed then it 
would be reasonable to suppose that Ben’s knowledge that Algy sped yesterday entails that 
Algy did not yesterday freely choose whether to speed.   
 Since Ben can prepunish Algy for the exercise of a genuine choice, there is no reason 
to suppose that Ben cannot also respect Algy’s ability to make that choice.  Moreover, as 
New points out [8, p. 63], there might be cases in which refusing to prepunish would 
constitute disrespect for the offender’s choice.   Suppose now that Ben is reasonably certain 
that Algy will fulfill his intention to promptly commit suicide after committing the offence.  
If Algy is morally punctilious, he might insist that he has a right to be punished.  Given that 
Ben is reasonably certain that Algy cannot be prevented from carrying out his intentions, it 
seems plausible to say that Ben would fail to respect Algy’s autonomy by not fining him 
now.   
 
V. Bad Reasons For The Desert Theorist 
 
An objection that might be made by a desert theorist is that being prepunished is like 
purchasing an indulgence for future sin.  More precisely this is the claim that by prepunishing 
Algy for speeding tomorrow, Ben gives Algy the right to speed tomorrow.   This claim might 
be supported by a commercial analogy.  The desert theory sees punishment as payment, and 
so prepunishment is a kind of prepayment.  But just as a person who has prepaid for goods 
has a right to them, so in being prepunished, Algy has right to speed tomorrow.  Thus it can 
never be justifiable to prepunish, because it is always wrong to punish someone for doing 
what he is entitled to do.  New objects that punishment is not like payment, thus the 
commercial analogy is misleading.  He points out that the purchaser has a right to his goods, 
because he has made an implicit or explicit contract with the vendor to receive them upon 
payment.  However, claims New, no such contract exists between the offender and the 
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authorities [7, p. 38].  But this objection is not decisive.  For some desert-theorists might hold 
that there is an implicit social contract between the offender and the authorities; all members 
of society, as potential offenders, have contracted  to submit to punishment for an offence if 
and only if they commit one. A stronger objection is found by comparison with 
postpunishment.  For if prepunishing Algy for speeding tomorrow now entitles him to speed 
tomorrow, then postpunishing him for having sped yesterday must now entitle him to have 
sped yesterday.  The coherence of this consequence is dubious, given that it appears to 
involve changing the past.  More importantly, if the consequence were true then no form of 
punishment whatever could be morally  justified, since it is always wrong to punish someone 
for doing what he is entitled to have done.  Nor would the discovery that Algy had been 
justifiably but mistakenly punished, entitle him to commit the crime, although it might entitle 
him to compensation. 
 
VI. Good Reasons For The Desert Theorist 
 
There is  however, a better reason for thinking that prepunishment is always morally wrong, 
which should be endorsed by the desert theorist.  This is that prepunishment is always a case 
of punishing someone who is innocent.  Desert theorists in particular, should take this 
objection seriously.  For if a person deserves to suffer in proportion to his moral culpability 
then obviously someone who is not culpable at all deserves no suffering.   And as Smilansky 
points out [13], even the most extreme utilitarian would recognise that it is a serious 
objection to his theory that it has the consequence that the innocent may be punished, a 
recognition evinced by the typical strategy of attempting to show that in practice this 
possibility would hardly ever arise. New however, argues that the equation between 
prepunishing and punishing the innocent is a confusion.  We are naturally inclined to say that 
Algy is innocent of speeding if and only if he has not yet sped.  But that might be simply 
because we have not yet considered prepunishment.   New comments [7, p.37], that 
retributivists may maintain, we all hold, or should hold, the principle that it is wrong 
to punish an innocent person; and punishing Algy before he commits his offence 
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infringes that principle, since it is punishing him while he is innocent.  But Ben may 
reply that we should distinguish between two forms of this principle.  The first form is 
that it is wrong to punish someone for an offence which he never commits, the second 
that it is wrong to punish someone for an offence which all involved know he intends 
to and will commit after his punishment.  Ben may contend that it is the first form of 
the principle we should  uphold, not the second ...  
The first form of the principle entails that Algy is innocent of speeding if and only if he never 
speeds.  If Ben is correct to accept this redefinition of innocence then since he is certain 
beyond reasonable doubt that Algy will speed then Ben should also be certain beyond 
reasonable doubt that Algy is not innocent.  Thus Ben can consistently agree that it is wrong 
to punish the innocent.  
 There is however a serious problem with New’s  redefinition of innocence, namely 
that it makes it impossible to give a coherent account of the idea of moral decay.  For if we 
accept that someone is innocent of a crime if and only if he never commits it, then we are 
forced to say nobody can ever pass from a state of relative innocence into a state of relative 
guilt.  Thus a baby is as guilty as any of its future selves, since any crime it commits in the 
future will disqualify it from innocence of that crime at any earlier point in time.   
 A desert theorist might escape this objection by appealing to the denial of the second 
form of the principle.  This commits him to saying that a person is now guilty of a crime if 
andonly if that person now intends to commit that crime and will commit it. This side-steps 
the objection, since babies don’t intend to commit crimes perpetrated by their future selves.  
But the new definition is too strong for two reasons. Firstly, it obliges us to say that nobody 
can now be guilty of past crimes.  For nobody intends to commit crimes that they have 
already committed. Nor can anyone commit the same crime that they have already 
committed.  Secondly, the definition forces us to discount guilt for future crimes of 
negligence and passion.  Consider a nurse who forgets to give a patient an injection which 
she knows he needs to live.  Although she is guilty of failing to discharge her duty to give the 
injection, her failure was unintended. Had she intentionally failed to give the injection then 
her crime would have been the more culpable one of murder.  Likewise, consider perpetrators 
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of crimes of passion, as in domestic assault, where the intention to assault one’s victim is 
formed only at the very last minute.  Obviously these people had no prior intention to commit 
such crimes.  Indeed, such a prior intention would be logically odd. In the first case it would 
be the intention to unintentionally fail to give the injection.  In the second, it would be the 
intention to deliver a blow tomorrow which one had not, until that very moment, intended to 
deliver.  In both cases, if the intention is preserved and results in the action (or inaction) then 
that action was intended, and so was not the kind of crime that the offender intended to 
commit.  Thus one can fulfill an intention to commit a crime of negligence or passion only if 
there is an instant between the formation of that intention and the action in which it issues, at 
which that intention disappears.  But then by the disputed definition, that is the instant at 
which the offender ceases to be guilty.  Thus the claim that prepunishment is always 
punishment of the innocent seems to be a strong objection after all.   
 
VII. Bad Reasons For The Deterrence Theorist 
 
A deterrence theorist might be tempted to say that prepunishing Algy is morally unjustified 
because it can have no deterrent effect.  But as New points out, ‘in pre- as much as in 
postpunishment the penalty imposed may deter potential offenders, as also the actual 
offender, from committing other offences in the future’ [7, p. 38].   Nonetheless the 
deterrence theorist might insist that the deterrent effect of prepunishment is necessarily more 
restricted than that of postpunishment, because it cannot deter the offender from committing 
the very same crime for which he is being punished.  New assumes that this claim is true, but 
points out that it is (also) true of postpunishment [7, p. 38].  Nothing, including postpunishing 
Algy, can now deter him from speeding yesterday, unless we accept backward causation.  
Thus even if it were true that prepunishing Algy cannot deter him from speeding tomorrow, 
this would not pose a special difficulty for prepunishment.  But New is wrong to assume that 
Algy cannot be deterred from committing the very crime for which he has been punished.  
Admittedly, since Ben is reasonably certain that Algy will commit the crime, he should be 
reasonably certain that prepunishing Algy won’t deter him from committing it.  But unlike 
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knowledge, certainty, however reasonable, might still be mistaken.  Thus it does not follow 
that Algy will not be deterred from speeding tomorrow.  Nor does any other feature of the 
example preclude so deterring him.  We have already established that Algy still has a genuine 
choice tomorrow whether to speed.  And since Ben’s reasonable certainty that this choice 
will result in speeding might be mistaken, Algy might use that choice to refrain from 
speeding.  Thus there is nothing to stop us saying that prepunishing Algy might successfully 
encourage him to choose to be innocent of speeding tomorrow.     
 Indeed there seems to be an example where  prepunishing Algy does deter him from 
committing the very crime for which he has been punished.  Suppose that the unpleasantness 
of Algy’s prepunishment leads him to reflect on his would-be speeding career.  He  
recognises that since prepunishment has been instituted, he will not continue to evade 
punishment.  He also forms the reasonable expectation of further doses of prepunishment for 
each of the speeding offences he had intended to carry out each day after tomorrow.   
Suppose further that Algy recognises that his speeding is a compulsive habit.   Even if he 
knows that he has nothing to lose by speeding tomorrow, he might know himself well enough 
to see that it is now in his interest to drop the habit.  Since he knows that the thrill of 
speeding on any one occasion will reinforce the compulsion to speed again, he sensibly 
reasons that the best way to drop the habit is to desist immediately. 
   
VIII. Good Reasons For The Deterrence Theorist 
 
Now look at Ben’s aim as a deterrence theorist.  In postpunishing Algy for speeding, Ben is 
trying to deter would-be offenders, including Algy himself, from committing the same type 
of crime after the punishment has been given. This must be likewise true of prepunishment.  
Thus in prepunishing Algy for speeding tomorrow, Ben is trying to deter would-be offenders, 
including Algy himself, from committing speeding offences after the punishment has been 
given.  But in prepunishment, these speeding offences include the very offence for which he 
has already been punished.  If Ben succeeds (as he might in the case of Algy the compulsive 
speedster) then Algy will choose not to speed tomorrow, so trivially, he will never speed 
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tomorrow.  So Ben will have punished a person who, by any definition, is innocent.  Thus 
Ben is trying to do something which is morally wrong.  Since trying to do something which is 
morally wrong is itself morally wrong, Ben should not prepunish Algy. 
 It might be replied that we should describe Ben’s aim as only trying to deter Algy 
from speeding on all occasions after that for which he has been punished.   But in fact, this 
isn’t even true of postpunishment.  Suppose that Ben punishes Algy for having sped the day 
before yesterday.   By so doing, Ben cannot be trying to deter Algy from having sped 
yesterday.   Moreover, the redescription forces us to say that by prepunishing Algy, Ben is 
not trying to deter him from committing other speeding offences before that for which he has 
been punished.  Now the aim of deterrence is much more modest than it should be.  This 
becomes conspicuous if we suppose that Algy has been prepunished for a crime that lies far 
in the future, or at least, as far as reasonable certainty allows.  There is now a significant 
portion of Algy's would-be criminal career that Ben cannot even try to change.  
 A similar argument that prepunishment is wrong can be given by moral reformers. 
The reformer hopes that punishment for a crime will improve the moral character of the 
criminal to the extent that he will choose to refrain from the same type of crime in the future.  
But in prepunishment this becomes the strange hope that the person who has been punished 
will not commit any future crime of the same type, including that for which he has been 
punished.  The most successful form of reformation (or deterrence) is that which takes effect 
as soon as possible after punishment and which lasts as long as possible with respect to future 
opportunities for crime of the same type as that for which punishment was given. If the 
reformer's hope is realised, he has punished an innocent person.  
 There is, moreover, a simple reason why prepunishing Algy will normally fail to deter 
him from committing that very crime.  This is that prepunishing Algy gives him an 
entitlement.  Admittedly, the entitlement is not to the crime itself, as we saw in § V.  
Nonetheless, if Algy has faith in the justice of the system, he should recognise that he has 
nothing to fear by speeding tomorrow.  Most will agree that nobody can be given fair and full 
punishment more than once for the same crime.  Thus prepunishing Algy does entitle him to 
immunity from further punishment if he does speed tomorrow.  The same cannot be said for 
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postpunishment.  Suppose that after having been postpunished by Ben for speeding 
yesterday,  Algy does speed tomorrow and is then punished again by Ben for having done so.  
Although Ben has punished Algy  more than once, he has not done so for the same crime.   
  
 To recap, Algy should recognise that since he has already been punished fairly for 
speeding tomorrow, doing so won’t attract further punishment.  So unless he has a special 
reason for not speeding tomorrow, such as breaking a habit, prepunishing him will fail 
disastrously to deter him from speeding tomorrow.  Thus Ben is irrational, for he must try to 
do something which he should recognise is likely to fail.  Ben is irrational in a second way as 
well, for since he is reasonably certain that Algy will speed tomorrow, he is trying to do 
something, namely deter Algy from speeding tomorrow, which he should be reasonably 
certain will fail.  Since Ben has no rational justification for prepunishing Algy, he has no 
moral justification for doing so either. 
 Suppose that Ben’s attempt to deter Algy does fail and Algy speeds anyway.  Here a 
general accounting problem emerges for deterrence theorists.  Since Ben’s aim was to deter 
Algy from speeding, then the punishment should have been more severe, for clearly it wasn’t 
an effective warning.  Secondly, since Ben is reasonably certain that Algy will speed 
tomorrow, he should be reasonably certain that Algy will flout the dignity of the warning, 
thereby deepening his culpability. Thus prepunishment dictates that Ben should have 
imposed a severer punishment than that thought proportional to the social cost of simple 
speeding.  But this is unfair to Algy, since his intention was only to speed.        
 Since Ben has already prepunished Algy for speeding tomorrow, it would even be 
unfair for Ben to prevent him from speeding tomorrow, for then Ben would have punished 
someone who is innocent of speeding tomorrow.  By bringing about the innocence of a 
person who has been punished, Ben would have brought it about that an innocent person has 
been punished. To do so is morally wrong.  It follows that if Ben’s reasonable certainty that 
he is  powerless to prevent the crime were confounded by the unlikely realisation of a way to 
do so, Ben would still be wrong to so prevent it. By prepunishing Algy, Ben has transformed 
his practical inability to prevent Algy from speeding into a moral inability to do so.  In other 
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words, Ben has committed himself to saying that  if  there were a way to prevent the crime, 
he would be wrong to so prevent it.  Ben would be wrong to say this, even if he is certain (or 
even if he knows) that there is no way to prevent the crime, since he has a duty to prevent 
crime should it be within his power to do so.  So both the desert and the deterrence theorist 
survive the fantastic example since both can find good reasons for judging prepunishment 
wrong.  But the desert theorist enjoys an advantage over the deterrence theorist.  The desert 
theorist should say that prepunishment is wrong because it is a case in which an innocent 
person is punished, whereas the deterrence theorist should say that it is wrong because it aims 
to bring this case about.  The deterrence theorist’s position is thus subordinate to that of the 
desert theorist’s, for unless it were wrong to punish an innocent person, it would not be 
wrong to try to do so.  The other three reasons to which the deterrence theorist can appeal for 
judging prepunishment wrong appear to be likewise subordinate to those of desert. The 
reason why Algy will likely fail to be deterred from committing the crime for which he is 
being punished, is his recognition of the principle that nobody can be given fair and full 
punishment more than once for the same crime.  This same principle is what transforms 
Ben’s practical inability to prevent the crime into an absurd moral inability to do so.  Yet this  
principle is itself a consequence of the desert theorist’s most fundamental principle that a 
person deserves to suffer in proportion to his moral culpability.  The accounting reason seems 
likewise subordinate, since giving Algy extra punishment for doing something he does not 
intend to do is unfair to Algy only because it is undeserved.   
 
XI. Feldman On Predesert and Prepunishment 
 
Feldman gives three examples of  predesert.  In the first, the Make-a-Wish Foundation offers  
a trip to Disneyland to the most deserving sick child, one of which is certain to recover and 
one of which is certain to die.  Feldman holds that  
in the absence of any unusual and so far unstated factors, the child with the fatal 
disease would be the more deserving, precisely because he is going to suffer the 
greater misfortune [3, p.73].  
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His second example, anticipated by New [7, p. 62], is of soldiers about to embark on a 
suicidal mission. Instead of decorating the soldiers with medals posthumously, the 
commanding officer decorates them in advance [3, p. 73].  The final example is a customs 
inspector who apologises to a traveller for having to search his bags.  Feldman comments 
 The inspector is apologizing for something that is about to happen.  It is reasonable to 
 suppose that the innocent traveller deserves the apology even before his privacy has 
 been violated [3, p. 75]. 
Can these cases of predeserved charity, reward and apology be extended to include cases of 
predeserved punishment?  If so we should consider the following argument:   
 P1 It is morally justifiable for a legal authority to punish someone if and only if  
he deserves it  
 P2 There are cases in which someone predeserves punishment 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
 C There are cases in which it is morally justifiable for a legal authority to  
  prepunish someone. 
It is unclear how Feldman would respond to this argument.  He distinguishes between the 
claim that  
 DT) There are no cases of predesert 
which he thinks false and the legal principle that ‘no judge or jury may determine that a 
certain person deserves punishment under the law at a time in virtue of the fact that he will 
later commit a certain crime’ [3, p. 77, my italics], i.e. 
 LP) No legal authority should decide that someone predeserves punishment. 
Feldman gives four reasons for accepting LP, but points out that LP does not entail DT. The 
discussion in previous sections above shows that none of these four reasons are good. 
Feldman’s first reason why prepunishment is wrong is that  
Even when we have quite good evidence, we rarely know precisely what the future 
will bring.  There is always (or almost always) the chance that the person will not 
commit the crime.  Thus it is safer to adopt the general policy of always waiting to see 
what the future brings.  If he commits the crime, we can immediately step in and set 
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the wheels of justice grinding.  If he does not commit the crime, we will have avoided 
a terrible injustice’ [3, pp. 76-7].   
Admittedly, this remark  does seem to explain why we are more reluctant to prepunish than 
to ‘prereward’.  If our reasonable certainty that the future basis of reward will exist (for 
example that the kamikaze pilots will successfully complete their suicide mission) is 
mistaken, then we can nullify the reward by taking it back (in this case, by recalling the 
medal).  But if prepunishment constitutes genuine suffering, then no amount of compensation 
would be preferable to the injustice of having inflicted it in the first place upon an innocent 
person.  The injustice of an undeserved reward seems less than the corresponding injustice of 
an undeserved punishment.  However, the safer policy cannot be adopted in New’s example, 
since Ben knows that he is unable to postpunish Algy.   Thus New is free to argue that if Ben 
does not prepunish Agly and his reasonable certainty that he will commit the offence is 
correct, then he will have no way at all of punishing someone who will be guilty.  And the 
injustice of failing to punish the guilty is at least as great as that of punishing the innocent.  
Moreover, since Ben is reasonably certain that Algy will commit the offence, there is a lesser 
risk of bringing about the latter injustice by  prepunishing than there is of bringing about the 
former injustice by not prepunishing. Feldman’s second reason is this: 
Consider a typical case in which it seems quite likely that a certain person will 
commit some crime. We think he will deserve the legally mandated punishment only 
if he will be responsible for the crime and we think that he will be responsible for the 
crime only if he will commit it ‘freely’; and we think that if he will commit it ‘freely’, 
then it cannot yet be quite certain that he will commit it. There must still be some 
possibility that he will decide not to commit it. So we insist upon a legal system that 
prohibits punishment-in-advance [3, p. 77].  
Of course it is true that if Algy deserves the punishment then he will commit the crime freely.  
And it is also true that if he commits it freely then there exists a possibility that he will refrain 
from committing it.  But this gives us no reason at all to say that prepunishment is wrong.  As 
shown in § IV, that possibility is consistent with Ben’s reasonable certainty or even with his 
knowledge, that Algy will freely chose to commit the crime.  The possibility that Algy will 
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refrain from committing the crime is no reason for not prepunishing him, for the same 
possibility exists in postpunishment as well.  If Algy deserves to be punished for a crime he 
committed yesterday, that is because it was then possible for him to refrain from committing  
it.  Thus Ben can consistently say that there now exists the possibility that Algy refrained 
from committing the crime yesterday, even if he is reasonably certain, or even if he knows, 
that in fact Algy freely chose to commit the crime yesterday.  Feldman’s third reason is this: 
Suppose the law permitted punishment-in-advance. Surely there would be safeguards.  
Advance punishment would be permitted only in cases in which it is perfectly certain 
that the suspect is going to commit the crime (That is, it is certain that he will commit 
the crime unless the law steps in and prevents his doing so.) But if we have such sure-
fire knowledge that the suspect is going to commit the crime, it would make even 
better sense to step in and prevent that criminal behaviour [3, p. 77]. 
But prevention is not a sensible policy in New’s example.  There, Ben is reasonably certain 
that Algy will commit the crime unless he prevents it but he is also reasonably certain that he 
is unable to prevent it.  If Ben forgoes prepunishment in the failed attempt to prevent the 
crime then no form of punishment will be possible.  On the other hand, Ben knows that he 
can succeed in giving prepunishment.  Of the two moral options, prepunishment has a vastly 
greater chance of success than prevention.  Feldman’s final reason is this: 
Suppose a person appears at the police station and offers to pay a fine for speeding.  
She says that she is going to speed later in the day, and wants to pay the fine in 
advance so as to avoid red tape and inconvenience ... To accept the money and agree 
that she deserves the fine would be to acknowledge that she is going to speed, and in 
effect to grant her permission to do so, and this the officer cannot do. [3, p. 77, my 
italics].  
But we have already seen in §V that prepunishing the offender does not entitle her to commit 
the crime.  Rather, as shown in §VIII, doing so entitles her to immunity from further 
punishment.   Feldman’s reasons seem not only to commit him to LP, but to the rejection of 
C as well.  Since the argument for C is valid, he is committed to rejecting P1 or P2. Full-
blooded desert theorists would insist that P1 is true. The safest way to avoid a commitment to 
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C is thus to deny P2. Thus Feldman should not just say that an authority should never decide 
that there are cases of predeserved punishment.  Rather he should say that no such case can 
exist.  As shown in  §V, this is correct; there is no case of predeserved punishment, because 
there is no case in which anyone who is innocent of an offence can deserve being punished 
for it.   
 
X. Are Feldman’s Examples Of Predesert Authentic? 
 
Can Feldman consistently admit that there are no cases of predeserved punishment while also 
holding that there are cases of predeserved charity, reward and apology?  To do so would 
commit him to finding a principled distinction between such predeserts and predeserved 
punishment. Doing so is likely to be messy.  A simpler strategy would be to argue that there 
are no cases of predesert at all.   I will therefore conclude by showing that it is far from clear 
that Feldman’s three examples are genuine examples of predesert.  
 The example of the two sick children is the most recalcitrant. But perhaps the 
plausibility of the claim that the child with the fatal disease is the more deserving is 
explained by the fact that if we grant that either of the children deserves the charitable 
benefits then we should further grant that the fatally ill child is more deserving than the one 
which is not.  But of course conceding this leaves us free to insist that strictly speaking, 
neither child deserves any benefits, although the charitable bestowal of benefits is an act of 
kindness.  Feldman says that he finds this suggestion ‘deeply implausible - perhaps even 
offensive’ [3, p. 73, fn. 10].  But however else we describe the bestowal, surely it is an act of 
kindness. So Feldman must say that it is a kindness which is deserved.  Now it is both 
plausible and inoffensive to claim that the Make-a-Wish Foundation is being as kind to the 
fatally ill child as anyone could be.  But if the bestowal is undeserved then surely it would be 
an act of even greater kindness. 
 Is Feldman’s customs office giving a deserved  apology?  One plausible answer is that 
he is not, even if the traveller turns out to be innocent of carrying contraband.  For all the 
officer knows, the traveller may be carrying it.  Thus the officer is simply doing his duty in 
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searching the bags and thus invading the traveller’s privacy. Since he is doing his duty, he is 
doing no wrong to the traveller, and since an apology is deserved only in virtue of a wrong, 
the traveller deserves no apology at all.  The officer’s words are merely an expression of 
regret in the form of an elaborate courtesy.  
 There is an alternative consequentialist view of the matter.  All would agree that the 
traveller does not deserve the apology if he is guilty of carrying contraband, since in this case 
the invasion of privacy is fully justified.  But it might be insisted that the apology is deserved 
if the traveller is innocent of carrying contraband.  If so, then whether the apology made 
before the search was justified will depend on the outcome of the search. But this means that 
the officer would not be justified to give an unconditional apology. To do so is assure the 
traveller that he will be found innocent, while at the same time searching his bags.  Such an 
apology is insincere, and thus undeserved, since offering an insincere apology to someone 
does him a disservice.  Thus the officer should really give the conditional apology, ‘If your 
bags reveal no contraband, then I now apologise for invading your privacy’.  But such an 
apology is incoherent.  Suppose that the search reveals no contraband.  Then it follows that 
the officer has already apologised before the search for invading the traveller’s privacy.  But 
the officer was then in no position to know the outcome of the search.  This means that when 
he made the apology for invading the traveller’s privacy, he was then in no position to know 
that he had made one.  This is absurd.  Nobody can genuinely apologise if he is unable to 
know that he is so doing.  To avoid this absurdity, the officer should really say ‘If your bags 
reveal no contraband, then I will apologise for invading your privacy’.  If the bags reveal no 
contraband then the traveller will deserve the apology for having had his privacy invaded.  
Clearly this is not a case of predesert. 
 This leaves us with a final possibility that the officer knows that the traveller is 
innocent, yet still apologises for the invasion of privacy that will occur. But then the invasion 
of privacy is intentionally needless. In this case, saying ‘Sorry Sir, I’m going to have to 
search your bags’ is like saying, ‘Sorry mate, I’m going to punch you in the face just for the 
fun of it’.  Feldman’s view of the woman who pays her fine in advance commits him to 
admitting  that such an apology is undeserved.  If it is true that ‘to accept the money and 
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agree that she deserves the fine is to acknowledge that she is going to speed, and in effect to 
grant her permission to do so’, then it must be likewise true that for the victim to accept the 
apology and agree that it is deserved is to acknowledge that he is going to be assaulted and in 
effect to grant the assailant permission to do so.  We have already seen however that 
Feldman’s view is mistaken.  A better reason why the apology is not deserved is that it is 
insincere.  Suppose that a person needlessly insults a colleague and then apologises.  He then 
continues to repeat the insults, each time apologising afterwards.  If we know that this person 
has the ability to curb the insulting behaviour then we will judge his apologies insincere.  To 
sincerely apologise for an action is to commit oneself to refraining from actions of the same 
type subsequent to the apology. The will-be assailant makes no such commitment, since he 
manifestly fails to try to refrain from gratuitous assaults subsequent to the apology.  Indeed 
he announces his intention to perpetrate one.   
 Finally we return to the example of prereward. Feldman correctly dismisses the 
objection that the commanding officer has only rewarded the pilots for the past act of 
volunteering for the suicide mission, but fails to provide a reason.  The reason might be that 
in a parallel case of postreward, the commanding officer should bestow a lesser reward upon 
all those who volunteered (by awarding them a less honorific medal) yet reserve a greater 
reward (the more honorific posthumous medal) to those who had completed the mission. 
Otherwise we would be forced to say that those who volunteered for the mission but failed to 
complete it are as deserving of honour as those who volunteered and succeeded.  Since 
completion of the mission is a necessary condition for deserving the greater reward, that is 
what we should say too in the case where the medals are awarded before embarking on the 
mission.   
 Non-consequentialists might refuse to accept this claim however.  If the moral desert 
of an action is based on the intentions and dispositions of the agent rather than its outcome, it 
seems that there is no basis for prereward.  In the case of postreward it might be insisted that 
the success of the mission was of importance only because it was evidence of the pilots 
willingness and ability to complete it.  On this view, the pilots do not deserve to be honoured 
because they will succeed in completing the mission, nor because they have merely 
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volunteered to do so, but because they are now ready and able to do so.  On this way of 
looking at it, if the commanding officer is confident that the pilots are now willing and able 
to complete the mission, he should award the medal even if the mission is cancelled due to 
bad weather.  But this is not a case of predesert.    
 Support for this reading is given by a similar verdict to a similar case.  Suppose that a 
university stipulates that promotion is deserved only if a published book is delivered into the 
hands of the administrators. Dr. X has already had the book accepted, and a first copy is now 
on its way from the printers to his office at the university.  He has arranged to witness the 
hand-over today, since he can then fly to a conference in the knowledge that he has been  
promoted. But a mechanical breakdown has delayed delivery.  Dr. X informs the 
administrators of this fact plus all relevant background information.  But they refuse to 
concede that he now deserves the promotion.  Dr. X  decides to attend the conference 
anyway, in the knowledge that he has not been promoted.  Since Dr. X was not at all 
responsible for the delay, this seems unfair.  The administrators may acknowledge that the 
book will shortly be received.  They might even admit that they could collect the book 
themselves before the cut-off time for catching the plane, but also admit that they can’t be 
bothered to do so.  In a thus-embellished case, shouldn’t Dr. X be acknowledged as now 
deserving promotion?    
 But there is another way of looking at it.  For the administrators to admit that the 
promotion is deserved in the embellished case is to soften the original claim that it is not 
deserved until the book is delivered, to the claim that it is not deserved unless it is delivered.  
This softening is authentic, since the latter claim does not entail the former2.  But the new 
claim is arguably not soft enough.  The administrators should really say that the promotion  is 
not deserved unless the book is deliverable.  Again the softening is authentic, since this 
guarantees nothing about the actuality or time of eventual delivery. But to admit that Dr. X 
deserves the promotion because has now written a book which is deliverable, is not an 
admission of predesert. 
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Notes 
1. Endorsed by [2 , p. 11], [4, p. 72], [5, p. 73], [6, p. 93], [10, p. 154] and [11, p. 117].  
 
2. As Alan White pointed out long ago [15, p. 45]: 
  Certainly, the devaluation of the pound would not have been the beginning of 
  a decline or a fatal mistake unless events of a certain character subsequently 
  occurred ... but, if such events did subsequently occur, then the devaluation of 
  the pound was - rather than subsequently became - the beginning of a decline 
  or a fatal mistake. 
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